

- 1) Mr Ellsberg
- 2) Mr Friedman
- 3) Mr Rowen AR

Don't lose
any of attachments

I speak before Council on For.
Relations in NY Feb. 10. General
Subject: How to influence "revolutionary
situations." I.e., third class wars &
their incipency

Consult with each other on pitch
I should take. Govt structure to deal
with it? Role of integrated efforts of AID, USA,
State, CIA, DOD? Characteristics of "trouble"
cases — Spheres of influence, open borders, poor
training for govt, simple uniting or splitting
factors, etc.? Extent to which other side gets
what we lose (Congo?)? Etc. Etc.

I must give Boardman at least a
title plus a sentence by Sat. 1/16/65.

Do I care who presides?

Jan —
1/13/65

1. Marder: ^{1/30/65} "Unlike the Communists in a similar situation, the United States in Viet-Nam is ungaled by Western Standards, Western mores and Western legal concepts."

The Press; the audience; the role of ambiguity; willingness to sacrifice (ever?) today to better tomorrow.

2. Marder ^{1/30/65} (quoting Dulles): "the tyranny of the weak."

3. Our real stakes: Messianic + Self-preservation

4. How relevant is it that SVN wants us there?

See Gen. Canol's draft, also read Red guide-books.

5. What are the techniques of insurgency?

Messianic zeal, patience, cells, terrorism,

6. Uneven choice: Clear shot for them vs. hobbled shot for us.

7. Relevance of (a) Sphere of influence (geography, recent ^{and asserted commitment,} propaganda, ~~etc~~ economic), (b) same ancestry, (c) same enemies, (d) degree of civilization, (e) language, (f) size, (g) value of the "pawn," (h) difference in economic standards, (i) personal relations

8. Role of relative importance — cf. deliberate down-grading, & being pre-empted by larger problems.

9. Problem of melding our strengths — political, military, psychological, economic. How administer?

10. Sato's ^{predecessor} ^{1/12/65} remark re US being too logical.

11. Oanh's ^{1/11/65} CBS remark re ruling by prestige, not law.

12. Wohlstetter's thesis re Titoists (Yugoslavia vs Cuba vs SVN).

13. The role of rising expectations (per Galbraith)

14. The role of passage of time as a "tamer." (Time tames)

15. Must Socialist regimes be pro-Communist and anti-American?

See Polk's view: US pushes farm, Soviet pushes industry.
16. What exactly do we want to see develop in backward countries?
Do we want them to "keep quiet" (stay on the farm) or to surge forward in industry?

17. Can a nation be internally revolutionary & externally quiescent?
(if country is still traditionally controlled?)

See Polk 27

18. Does (US) education = "revolution"? ^{even} I.e., does military training (viz. education) & schooling create Polk's "new men" & ∴ revolution?

Polk p 23

19. Importance of a few dedicated people (like yeast?)

Polk p 24

20. Importance of "representative govt" (made up of power sine qua non)

21. Should we waste time & assets on "irrelevant" groups

(Polk says traditional lower class is irrelevant in Egypt.)

22. Moral justification for supporting traditional regimes — say for 5-10 years (until virulence of red threat subsides).

23. Is the issue "our way vs their way" or is it "our way with them harassing vs. their way with us out"?

24. How do we determine what groups are "relevant"? Note Polk says lower class (80%) in Egypt is irrelevant. Ditto Algeria.
Cf. the relevance of the apparatus (higher ups) who are doing things — e.g. land reform — for the "irrelevant" masses.

25. Does the creation of Changers (New Men) come in surges, to be digested?

French
left a
void?

26. Is SVN a case where there is a "void" at the top, so that our kind of adaptation can't work. Or is it enough to have us nurturing & ^(Army, AID, USIA, etc) inspiring thousands of Vietnamese who will form the politically conscious base for a new non-Communist SVN?
27. Hoffer idea of "maintenance" and Occidental superiority. The bulldoggedness of refusing to knuckle to the price of time.
28. What give one kind of "Changers" an edge over other "changers"? E.g., Communies vs. US — with or without a political aim!
29. Wisdom of much better organized investment in training elite of marginal countries.
30. Do we assume inevitable pressure toward "progress"?
31. Bob Kramover (sp), with AID (formerly ISA), has views on SVN.

stand to combat, because the "gangster" task is small,
requires few resources: doesn't have to stay and fight;
strike at unprotected spots (police can't be everywhere),
stay uncaught, demonstrate that you can't protect....

If our task were only to hold on to bases (e.g. Guantamo) it would
be simpler. But we don't want a few enclaves in a
hostile world (Berlin, Guantamo, offshore islands, Hong Kong).
And we don't want to run the Southern Hemisphere.

Our interests are compatible with a wide range of states &
evolutions in these areas

in most particular cases,

We do not demand, bases, or trade, or raw materials,
or a flattering image of ourselves (though all of them are desirable).

We do not want large blocs of hostile nations
excluding us & our influence & ideals, expanding, developing military threats
to us

How can we ~~export our power to~~ ~~halt~~ prevent the spread of totalitarian regimes closely linked to the Communist Bloc throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world? We are concerned in many ways and for many reasons with the welfare, orientation and ^{evolution} ~~development~~ of the ~~under~~ developing nations, but ~~the most~~ the most immediate challenge to our national interests is the threat of a progressive expansion of Communist regimes by means of subversion and insurgency.

2. It is frustrating, and apt to be baffling, that with our enormous strengths and sources of influence we should find it so difficult to achieve our purposes in this field. Yet it is no ~~real~~ coincidence that that our confrontation with Communist goals and power has shifted to an arena and a type of conflict in which our familiar instruments and techniques of power are at a relative disadvantage. We are not facing, in the Communist Bloc, an unchanging force of nature that can be blocked in one way, ~~and~~ once and for all; their efforts, now, to export revolution reflect ~~their own frustration~~ the effectiveness of the dams we have built against the quick and decisive spread of their dominance by invasion and massive threat. Those dams, in the form of U.S. military capabilities, military commitments, and military assistance, are highly relevant both large and ^{encompassing} to/rich allies facing the ~~armies still larger armies and missiles~~ army and missiles of the Soviet Union and to smaller, poorer allies bordering Communist China or satellites. To ^{block} ~~remove the threat of~~ more highly developed direct attack or ultimatum against the ~~established~~ nations, with established governments and systems of internal security, is effectively to safeguard their national integrity. That is not so for the developing societies, which are ^{fatally} ~~vulnerable to~~ ^{another} a form of attack that is relatively ineffective against the older, richer nations. ~~and~~

Chicoms (NVN) have a plan, a goal, a technique; an issue in the struggle for influence and for policy within the Bloc. A victory for them strengthens them within the Bloc, pushes policy in that direction, increases their own confidence in it, discourages resistance and will to make the long ~~and~~ struggle to maintain independence.

Just as a victory for K in the Cuban missile crisis... or Berlin

Issues of objectives become active when confronting:

- 1) Whether to involve ourselves at all;
- 2) Whether to increase commitment (as subjectively determined)
- 3) Whether to cut losses, reduce commitment
- 4) Who to back, in an internal competition for power or authority
- 5) interests in conflict not directly involving the Bloc

Issue: how important is it to us that our presence be desired: by the government in authority, by the major power sources, by the public?

How important is it to us that government be "legitimate"; democratic; civilian; popular?

~~How important is it that~~

Relevance of our strengths to ~~Sov~~ conflict in these areas nuclear, etc. ^{Uemoy}; VN 1954. Neutralizing otherwise strong ground threat; and now, nuclear threat. Actual buildup in force: litany; in limited war force.

"never again club": ~~ind~~ strong desire not to commit ground forces; increased ground capability compared to 1961 (Laos), or 1954 (VN).

Inhibitions against using nuclear weapons; ever; against "small" provocation and small nation; against Asians.

Hence, fear that strong reaction to covert aggression will escalate---not all the way---but up to large ground engagement or nuclear weapons.

Classes of threatened nations:

- a) those contiguous to Bloc ground forces, threatened by direct attack;
- b) those (same) where Bloc support of subversion is easy.
- c) Those where US already has strong commitment: perhaps for historic reasons.
- d) those where US ally has strong commitment (Malaysia)
- e) those where Communist lines of support are long and vulnerable (Cuba; Cong
- f) those threatened by non-Bloc nations: (Malaysia; Israel; Morocco)

Feeling of frustration: we can't solve the problems we are actually confronted with the instruments we have bought. But that reflects the effectiveness of those instruments in deterring threats to which ~~are~~ they are suitable: we aren't combatting Nature, but an opponent that adapts his methods to our weaknesses. Unfortunately, the courses left to him--the tactics of the weak--may bring him success. It is not that ~~our heavier guns~~ ^{guns} we are restrained from using our heavier guns as that they aren't clearly effective against these threats

CFR speech

Frustration: 26 squadrons, etc: the litany. Why can't we use this power? Why do we have it? (We're not fighting Nature; we would need it if we didn't have it. K explanation: less fear of escalation.

Rostow theory: deliberate escalation (note JCS version: don't creep up, use half-measures; use measure that will really stop them cold). (in part, this is rationale in terms of deterrence of action that is really meant to destroy capability—JCS preference—rather than to deter). (Note that both theories are untested; both plausible).

High irritation, friction quotient;
news value

Covertiness=Presidential/Excomm involvement (because of importance, and exclusion of staff, impossibility of delegation).

Opponents use tactics of the weak

CFR speech

Time of questioning : public impatience with expenditures, deaths, humiliations, and apparently little to show for it, little influence. WHY are we spending, involving ourselves?

Our objectives are found, determined gradually, evolve, in a series of actual choices on matters like:....

Some choices aren't seen as fixing goals, limiting later choices, at the time, but have their effect.

Others make us conscious that old rules, announced aims, may be outmoded or inadequate: challenge us to revise, modify, define anew what it is we want to achieve or avoid.

One class of underdeveloped nations are those threatened by attacks and subversion directed by the Communist Bloc--particularly Chicoms. There our objective is relatively clear: prevent Chicoms from gaining assets, strategic territory, prestige victory for method and power, and confidence.

A new motive for restraining Chicom victories: fear of growing Chinese strength, confidence and aggressiveness, plus declining confidence in the deterrent or operative power of the US, provides powerful incentive for acquiring national nuclear forces: early moves in this direction will stimulate others. A world in which nuclear weapons are widely diffused will be one in which US security in the most concrete sense ~~will be~~ can be challenged, in remote conflicts among small nations; small nations will be able to inflict significant damage on us, or our allies; they will be tempted to make threats against us, not only when they are in direct conflict with us, but to ~~exert~~ influence our use of our power and influence.

There are other nations, that aren't at present directly the object of Communist attentions; but they are always candidates, if they fail to develop governments and institutions that can provide order and movement toward meeting ~~the~~ public demands.

1. AID program: if there were no threat, we would still want to use part of our wealth to ~~help~~ help the less fortunate, build a world. Involvement of national security would be indirect, long-run. DOD involvement minimal: advice, some sales. Like AID, mainly a matter of giving a government--perhaps a rudimentary one--such resources as it can handle effectively.

2. ~~Efforts~~

Countries on periphery; threatened by invasion.

(In SVN, army oriented toward this.

Subversion: range from terrorism, to raids, to large attacks; from police problem to full armed forces problem. Police; self-defense; attack.

Role of our: nuclear strategic forces; tac nucs; naval, air power; recon; logistics, comm, support; combat support; air mobility; advisors; staffwork; arms, ammo.

28 Jan, 1965

Strongest case to be made for strikes against North (May-July, 1964):

Boost in morale for GVN and SVN people, evidence (commitment) that U~ would not start negotiations from position of weakness, US was willing to take risks, was in all the way; light at the end of the tunnel (possibility that NVN would lose heart--though this could backfire if NVN was tough); something new, a chance; pay back NVN (?).

(Possibility: also effect on VC, e.g., in recruitment).

(But if this was major factor--why pose in terms of committing US to go all the way--rather than reprisal policy?

Also: if this had been accepted as major problem, major goal--then this particular tactic should have been viewed in context of all other possible and ongoing actions that would ~~inter~~ affect interpretation of US motives, boost GVN confidence. Hard to staff this one explicitly, because it involves admitting frankly that problem is one of SVN confidence in our intentions, and that our actions had contributed to some doubts.))

Was this really never put to President at time of Honolulu--or later?

((ExComm organization as suited

Exporting US influence in Unstable Societies

What is it we want?

Who must we influence, and what do we want of them?

How can we influence them?

Security must solve several problems at once:

- 1) Combatting the guerrillas: protecting the rural areas
providing security
giving peasants a stake in the regime
- 2) building a governmental structure
- 3) satisfying demands of politically relevant groups

Developing societies share: all target for Com infiltration.

SVN is "infant" test case of Chicom technique.
But will serve to demonstrate.

Coms have called their shots; if they win in SVN...
Technique has their brand-name but if they lose...

Most cases of effort of us today show Chicom influence.
of example or ~~to~~ trying to direct aid.
(Cuba; Congo; Indonesia).

Nature of problem: there were:

- a) against backwardness, poverty, disease
- b) against old institutions, power structures; for control of gov
- c) against Com-supported guerrillas.

Final against gangsters: competition to provide gov (taxes, etc.)
Protection racket: ~~warped~~ ~~stink~~ no trouble, get paid

off the spot: no path to peace & development save Communist, because
any other will be "unstable." (guerrillas will provide stability if no one else will.)

3. What are the pitfalls in collaboration?

- a. No short list of objectives exhausts all the interests that either side brings to bear on issues of policy.

Our considerations of prestige and commitment, in the context of worldwide responsibilities and a worldwide confrontation, x--none of which are shared by the nation being defended--can give us a different sense of timing or priority concerning specific mea

The underdeveloped nations are, in fact, highly vulnerable to a kind of attack against which our heavier weapons are relatively ineffective.

When we have protected our major allies against major attack, their security is pretty well protected: they aren't very vulnerable to "third-class attacks," under-the-door attacks.

(Moreover, the threat to which they are vulnerable is mainly military: doesn't call for as much coordination on US side; Moreover, it is a massive threat which we have largely deterred; coordination is in planning and developing posture, not in conducting operations. And large part of coordination of economic/military/political coordination can be performed by recipient, or with great cooperation).

But confronting ~~the~~ underdeveloped nations, Bloc has another path to success; in addition to direct attack, it can hope to win by subversion (as in West Europe immediately after the war).

Analogy: ~~we need like doctors who have developed vaccines that prevent killing~~ our expensive vaccines protect our rich patients against all viruses lethal to them; ~~but~~ and they protect our poor patients against the same set of viruses; but that isn't enough to keep the poor patients alive--their resistance is lower, and they are vulnerable to another set of viruses that won't kill the rich patients.

Diseases to which countries with less than \$500 GNP per capita are vulnerable...

"War is in the country"--recognition of need to exert influence in the countryside, answer rural needs, stimulate will and ability for self-defense, preempt allegiance: get peasant to...be drafted, protect himself, resist cooperation with and taxation by VC, provide intelligence, . Need to get aid to countryside,....

More recently, realization ~~is found~~ that the cities are another battleground where the war can be lost

Bloc tactical objectives: military, countryside, in the cities; develop rival legitimate government (fight not just for territory but for legitimacy, coercive authority, taxes, draft bodies)

National interests:

1. Not so much critical raw materials, as formerly. (oil)
2. trade relationships: small, now (except Latin America)
3. strategic position; attack routes to other countries for Bloc; control of sea trade routes (Malaysia/Indonesia; Egypt; Panama)
4. Bases: communications, staging, overflight, naval purposes; intelligence.
5. Their interests: independence, stability, development; movement toward democracy, etc. (in long run, necessary to former).

(From US security point of view: independence is basic)

Who is it we want to influence? How do we want to influence their calculations and actions? What tools do we have?

Chicoms; Soviets; satellites--NVN leaders; VC hard core; VC recruits; peasants; urban; governments GVN, etc.

Single approach**whether economic, or administrative, or military--e simply won't do the job, except in massive doses (if then); a combination of approaches is essential.

(Note: under authoritarian government--Diem--we did have stability, yet we couldn't get him to do what we thought necessary: and largely because of his concern with incipient rivals.

Why are these sorts of problems at the forefront today of our attention? Partly because Bloc has increased its efforts and aggressiveness; partly because we have increased our commitments, gradually; because other programs are relatively completed, and effective, and because massive threats have declined (partly reevaluation by us, partly Bloc response to our programs and our actions, e.g. in Berlin and ~~SEA~~ Cuba). New significance in Sino-Soviet split.

What is underdeveloped: under \$500 GNP per person; (Spain, Greece, Turkey-197, Iran 215, UAR Syria; India, Pakistan, Afghan, 75-80; Phillipines 120, Taiwan 150, Korea 73; Latin America. (SVN 100).

Literacy rates: Iran 15, Saudi Arabia 5, Pakistan 15, India 24; SVN 35-40, Laos 15, Korea, 85.

Congo: 30 university graduates on coming into independence, Cambodia fewer. no professionals; no army. no gov.

Countries threatened by direct attack; Korea, Taiwan, SEA, Greece, Turkey, Iran; India, Pakistan somewhat.

Tools: a) diplomatic; alliances; information and cultural efforts; training of foreign students (55000 a year); b) our own military posture; ~~x~~ (nuclear, etc); (related to external security); c) our ability to help them in local job of preventing or dealing with insurgency: 1) MAP; 2) military training (16000 a year here); ~~px~~ 3) polite assistance; 4) intelligence assistance; 5) civic action. d) economic: 1) trade; 2) economic aid

We are not: using AID as a political instrument; using military force politically (civic action; self-defense; training;)

Problem: not (as traditional aid and military assistance envisions) helping a government to protect itself and its country, but helping establish a government, a political system (with loyal army, civil service, etc.) --in competition with Communists, who are trying to develop a rival government tied to the Bloc.

CFR speech

Our objective in SEA: to bring an end to Communist aggression/expansion.

(JFK?: our assistance would cease when NVN aggression ceased. This is not consistent with cutting out when the GVN--in response to successful NVN pressures in interests of Communist expansion--invites us out.)

Long-term: peace and independent nations, free to develop in their own fashion, free to seek assistance from outside. We hope for them to develop toward democracy ~~and~~ but we seek no satellites or mirror images of ourselves. Communism held at bay, contained, deterred, pressed to modify its aims.

SEA is a test case of our will and ability to respond to calls for help from nations striving to preserve their independence from Communist attack: nations that have a reasonable basis to make a claim on our assistance, who are willing to fight, and to whom we are committed. If we fail to respond, or if our response ends in failure, the implications for other nations under the shadow of Communist power will be far-reaching.

Test is as clear as in Berlin. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them.

Test case for Communist strategy of covert aggression. New strategy; we have learned to cope successfully with old ones at other levels; Strategic position of SEA.

Chicom doctrine focusses on SEA but poses threat to all developing societies. If we can cope with it (learn to) in SEA, the deterrent effect on Peiping can be decisive (if we don't, the demoralizing effect on other targets could be decisive).

Loss would be victory for Chicoms, and NVN, loss for US. Faith in US ability and will to resist communism in Asia shaken. Sense of inevitability of Chicom hegemony. Pressures for accommodation.

SVN will to win must be encouraged: by damping down terrorism, by military victories, and by effective economic and social measures to increase the people's welfare.

CFR speech

- If we seek to influence--expectations, attitudes, behavior--we face questions:
- a) Does US have the qualities, apart from physical strengths, required for success? Patience; staying power; understanding; tact; toughness; discretion (Can US keep its mouth shut, about activities that are essential, where publicity would embarrass local government or allies or arouse pressures?)
 - b) Can US reach decisions in timely fashion, be decisive, follow through--despite allied and neutral criticism and pressures, domestic criticism, enemy threats?
 - c) Is US quasi-colonialist; is country a satellite?
~~Is~~ Do we insist on running country, pick the leaders? (Yet we run risk of appearing to have no influence, to have our preferences and our prestige ignored, despite our aid)

US attitudes, customs (not always appreciated by, e.g., SEAsians):

1) "Need to tell."

2) Regard for "legalisms": treaties, forms of government, borders, status of "invitation to help".

3) Regard for world opinion.

- d) Does US have knowledge of local interests, attitudes, needs; sympathy for "Oriental mind, customs"?

And from long short out
((If it is our goal to stop the ~~Comm~~ Communist advance in SEA: then the SVN Army, and the peasants who resist, and the politicians who prevent coalition governments, are doing our fighting for us. We are in role of assisting them, not (only) because that is easier than doing the fighting and we are reluctant to comm t ground troops to Asia, but because (we think) they are the only ones who could successfully carry the main burden: an army with the taint of a colonialist power is simply not as effective against attack by insurgency. Meanwhile, the fight against the Communists is not the only important goal of the people involved: they want peace, a voice, ~~i~~ a place in the government, and latent demands for employment, education, better standards, etc.)) We can't afford to appear indifferent to these other interests; though we grow impatient when they show that their concerns are not focussed sharply on the one goal that is of predominant interest for us.

Quote on 2 SVN 3 factors

Show: Nature of threat of domination in various underdeveloped areas

Communist expenditures (Thia language training, use of NVN in Thailand
SVN troops, casualties, expenditures: will to fight.

VC resistance

G. G. 4 G. V. P.

Annex

We need to work with them even if they do not share our preoccupation with the Communist challenge as the one overriding problem: giving US public the impression that "they aren't interested in being saved"

4. ~~xx~~ B. The ~~role of the "new men,"~~ and US ~~int~~ priorities.

~~Throughout~~ Throughout the world, in the emerging nations--countries emerging from colonial rule or traditional, authoritarian regimes, from backwardness, illiteracy, sickness and poverty, from archaic ways and traditional power structures--the class of individuals that William Polk has labelled ~~x~~ "the new men" struggle for power and for change.

They are, as Polk defines them, "these people who possess the skill, the discipline, the orientation and the motivation to modernize society. ^{2:} students, engineers, technicians, ~~Western~~ foreign-trained military officers, industrial workers, agriculturists. If their position or influence in the government does not correspond to their importance or potential for in running the society, they will ~~be~~ striving to make it ~~do~~ so. If a traditional regime excludes them, they will be struggling--perhaps, in parallel with Communist-supported insurgents and terrorists--to topple it. If an important segment of "new men" is excluded from a ^{"revolutionary"} regime ~~fix document~~ (e.g., a military government of "young colonels" ~~2~~--~~as~~ a phenomenon that long antedates the present government of SVN) it will be struggling for inclusion. And if all important groups are represented, freeing the government (as we see it) ~~is~~ from internal politics to concentrate on internal security, we shall find the latter problem competing in their minds ~~values~~ with a menu of social, ~~and~~ economic ~~changes~~ and political changes they have contemplated and awaited for a very long time.

The nature of the problems that may arise in collaborating with the existing government will vary depending on the position ^{of} ~~of~~ the "new men."

The case of South Viet-nam illustrates most of the problems involved in exerting our influence and achieving our basic purposes in most of the underdeveloped nations. ~~These are of course not exceptions~~

It is an underdeveloped nation: \$100 GNP/person, like Thailand, Cambodia, Laos. Spain, Greece, Turkey, considerably higher though still under \$500; Philippines somewhat higher, also Taiwan; Korea, ~~and~~ India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, much of Latin America lower. L

Literacy rate, 35-40%: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, lower; Korea, higher.

It is in the class of countries contiguous to the Communist Bloc, threatened by direct attack as well as subversion: like Korea, Taiwan, the rest of SEA, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and to some extent India and Pakistan; unlike the Philippines, UAR or Syria, ~~North~~ Africa, Latin America.

It is one of the few under immediate pressure from the Bloc; some ~~like the Congo~~ others are ~~immediate~~ under immediate threat from non-Bloc neighbors—Malaysia, Morocco.

It is among those ~~that have~~ to which the U.S. has made strong commitments and has ~~invested~~ great effort and resources in support of those commitments. devoted

Colonial past; social structure; rivalries for power; splits; *many more*

Thus, amid the considerable variety of conditions within the underdeveloped areas, SVN is like some nations and unlike others. Moreover, many characteristics of its history, society and situation highly relevant to its vulnerability are, as in each of these nations, essentially unique. In particular, the existence within SVN from the time of its national origin in 1954 of ---- VC loyal to ~~the~~ direction from the North, and the ability to train and control ---- Southerners in the North and to infiltrate them back into SVN as cadre, is an advantage to the Communists not duplicated elsewhere.

However, even in a broad discussion of our problems in the future in the underdeveloped areas, SVN is far more significant than a mere illustration. ~~Our failure~~ Our failure to prevent Communist domination of SVN ~~will~~ would have consequences--all adverse--for the terms of our confrontation with the Communist Bloc in every area of the world.

1. The Communists have called their shot in SVN, and the US has clearly pledged its resources and its expertise to block them. Whatever the contribution of ~~weakness~~ uncontrolled factors, including conflicts and weaknesses in SVN society, a Communist takeover (even after a transitional phase) would be a clear victory for the Communists, a major defeat for the US. It could be expected to encourage and embolden the Communists in new pressures (already appearing in Thailand) throughout the world, to discourage the potential victims, and to downgrade the value of US assistance in resisting. *Like a victory for Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis or in Berlin.*

2. It would be a victory for the Chicoms, which would strengthen their influence within the Communist Bloc: a development that would imply increased pressures worldwide, especially in the underdeveloped areas.

3. It would be a victory for ~~the~~ a specific technique, encouraging its application--not only by the Chicoms, and not only by the Bloc (e.g., by Indonesia)--against underdeveloped nations throughout the world.

4. Each of these effects might be magnified by short-run consequences elsewhere in SEA -- *strategic location of SVN.*

Thus, distinguish:

- a) Countries under immediate threat of Communist subversion or attack
- b) Countries in which there is already significant US commitment, presence.

rely on the US to "take care of the Communists" may not reflect a low interest in the internal security campaign so much as a high importance attached to the political or economic struggles to which they prefer, if possible, to turn.

From our point of view, despite our willingness to commit more troops or effort ~~from the~~ in terms of overall importance of the task, it might be counterproductive to do so:

- a) if it leads to a more-than-compensating decline in national security efforts (e.g., more tendency to rely on US air support, less offensive ground action);
- b) if it decisively supports the insurgents' sense of a "cause": "throw out the foreign invaders." (Scarcely any insurgency has grown strong or succeeded without such a cause; and this particular one, referring either to a colonialist power or to a wartime invader, has been the most effective. It is already the primary talking point of the VC in SVN; but it could, perhaps, become more potent even there with a larger US presence).

e. ~~EX~~

(Remainder in outline)

3. What are the pitfalls in collaboration?

a. No short list of objectives--such as independence and development--exhausts all the interests that either side brings to bear on policy issues.

1. We are driven by considerations of our prestige and commitment in the context of a worldwide, continuing confrontation; and must take both worldwide responsibilities and domestic considerations into account.

2. The developing nation will have entered its presently emergent state with a vast slate of "highest-priority" tasks to be accomplished. It is not that the government and public do not regard internal security and avoiding a Communist takeover as important and urgent; but, compared to our view of our interests in the area (which we may tend to equate to theirs), they will rarely see those problems as the only goals of high importance. Staying in power, or achieving power; attaining a role in the government, or influencing it; abolishing aspects of discrimination or remnants of past practices or power structures; winning control of non-governmental hierarchies, e.g., religious or military; achieving a degree of local or minority autonomy (e.g., the Montagnards in SVN); all these are factional interests that can appear comparably important to "winning the war."

Destroying aspects of "backwardness"; starting development patterns so as to transform the social structure and the power base (William Polk: Egypt); developing prestige industries and prestige armaments and military organizations, including favoring conventional armies over internal security forces; achieving security against felt threats from non-Bloc neighbors (India-Pakistan; Arab-Israel); all these are ~~priority tasks that~~ national priorities that may compete with "winning the war." (likewise, "peace"; and raising the standard of living).

b. ~~3x~~ The emerging nation will not have a monolithic list of priorities. Not only will different factions weigh the urgency and importance of "national" goals differently; but they will have special interests of their own, notably including political goals (this includes the faction running the government, whether it is a traditional one still or represents a faction from the "new men.")

c. Important factions may view the imminence of Communist takeover differently from us (either higher or lower, in the short run); others may regard such a development as very bad, but not so ~~xx~~ catastrophic as we see it (e.g., they may overestimate, in our view, their ability to control or manipulate the Communists), affecting their willingness to take risks in the course of pursuing other interests (such as demonstrating, or changing the structure of the government).

d. There is a natural divergence of interest concerning the size and degree of reliance on US aid and operations. Again, a tendency to

Throughout the world, in the emerging nations--countries emerging ~~of~~ from colonial rule or traditional, authoritarian regimes, from backwardness, illiteracy, ~~and poverty~~ sickness and poverty, from archaic ways and traditional power structures--the ^{class of} individuals that William Polk has labelled ~~the~~ "the new men" struggle for power and for change. They are, as Polk defines them, "those people who possess the skill, the discipline, the orientation and the motivation to modernize society."

1. How can the US exert its influence to achieve its ends in the revolutionary struggles in the underdeveloped nations?
 - a. What are our ends?
 - b. Who must we influence, and what do we want of them?
 - c. What are our means of influence?
 - d. How shall we organize our efforts, and what are some obstacles?
2. Primary goal: to prevent the spread of Communist-dominated regimes, by invasion or by support of insurgency and coup, throughout the underdeveloped areas.

Various other interests--base and overflight rights, control of strategic water routes, trade relationships, critical raw materials--some of which, like the last, are less important than formerly, but none of which compare in importance to our interest in preventing the organization of these vast areas within

1. What are our security interests in the internal struggles of the developing societies?

We are not sure we know how to avoid failure in situations like South Vietnam; and failure ~~is a very high price to pay~~--the fact of failure, ~~of~~ the spectacle and feeling of being beaten by the nature of the problem and by a puny opponent--is a very high price to pay for a country that aspires to leadership of half the world.

We have learned some humility in South Vietnam; we have learned a little bit of what we don't yet know about influencing a government and a society that must deal at the same time with covert aggression, with demands for modernization, and with its own centrifugal tendencies and internal struggle for power. Those who still ~~are highly confident~~ ~~are highly confident~~ are highly confident about policies that will solve the nest of problems confronting South Vietnam are virtually sure to be among those whose notions have not yet been tested. We have much to learn about using military measures for *psychological and political* effect; and economic and to

Dilemma: ~~exchange~~ US forces---Native forces relax

Large US forces--onus of colonialism (and still difficult,
long, war)

We are not as strongly motivated as a colonial power--either by long
association, investments, domestic sentiments...

On the other hand, we have worldwide responsibilities to contain Communism;

Tradesx (conflicts, dilemmas):

1. Our desire to see Western ideals, practices, governmental structure prevail vs.
Our desire not to be "interventionist"; plus possible unsuitability of Western gov in experienced, non-Western culture
2. Short-term view vs. long-term.
e.g., from point of view of preventing disorder and Communist takeover:
In short-run, possible to maintain order by backing traditional rulers and power blocs, or highly authoritarian regimes (e.g., narrow military regimes), thus avoiding (postponing?) Communist takeover; but this may only postpone disorder, may even make it more explosive and disruptive when it does occur (and the Communists may still be around to collect). (Rhee; Diem).
(If you think that time will mellow the Chicoms as it has the Soviets, postponement of a "time of troubles" may have high value).
3. Assistance/training for Army, for internal and external security, vs. likelihood of Army coup, military government, postponing satisfaction of demands of the "new men." (SVN)
4. Development aid, education, etc., developing "new men" x = increased likelihood of revolutionary pressures, disorder.
5. Dislike of polite state, authoritarianism vs. vulnerability to insurgency

But these are dilemmas only when alternatives are limited to those that are "easy to achieve" with no change in American attitudes, organization, goals, way of operating; i.e., so long as:

change of regime = disorder

coming into power of Army = concentration of military goals, suppression of demands of civilian "new men" (e.g., Buddhist political leaders in SVN)

coming into power of civilian "new men" = naivete about tactics and goals of Communism

US military assistance = concentration on external defense (getting over this or on "defeating the enemy" rather than "defending the people")

US AID = concentration on "long term development" rather than building resistance to insurgency, which may mean assisting local government to present a program that will be popular (e.g., urban housing; see Polk on Algeria), support stability.

US non-interventionist policy = unwillingness to put effective pressure on regime that is heading for instability, or to back alternative group

US emphasis on legitimacy of government may be justified: in terms of gov self-confidence and assurance of action, as well as for actual support; but non-Western cultures may have different basis for feelings of legitimacy; e.g., strong feeling by Army that as the bringers of revolution they have both legitimate authority and responsibility; greater emphasis on personal prestige and authority, by character (Huong) and "sincerity." (Thus, both our occasional exercises in cynicism--backing governments that have no claim to legitimacy--Khanh--and our efforts in support of legitimacy--HNC vs. Army--may be misplaced).

This difference in priorities and perceptions can produce some conflict of interest between US and important factions--even majority--of people in the underdeveloped nation. (Independence from ~~the~~ Communists is only one goal--important, but not overriding--in their eyes. Changing government, acquiring power, creating a "new class," gaining power within subordinate power structure such as Army or Buddhist Association, achieving peace, raising standard of living, ~~participating in~~, or even gaining independence from all foreign presence including US, may all be goals important enough in eyes of powerful factions to take actions raising risk of Communist takeover; especially when risk is less in their eyes, or not so much in their consciousness, as in ours.) ("express" their feelings of legitimacy, responsibility)

When we yield in these situations to our desire to avoid intervention, we generally regret it (after Communists have, in fact, exploited situation.)

~~But of course~~

On the other hand, traditionalist or military leaderships may so suppress or aggravate popular grievances, in interests of effort against the Communists, as to make likely an eruption in the short run in which Communists are sure to gain. The very preoccupation of government/military leaders with suppressing or dealing with popular resentments (1963, 1964) can create opportunities for Communists to exploit.

Yet measures to make government more representative or to meet popular demands can be seen as jeopardizing the control of the governing leadership. Diem. In Diem's case, even measures that seemed to us necessary to fight the VC (strengthening of central staff of Army, less interference by Diem) conflicted with his desire to prevent coup. *(or regime can devote "too much" of its resources to exp. of conventional sort or for maintaining regime - Korea? Japan? GVN?)*

These conflicts are usually reflected in dilemmas ~~for~~ for US policy-makers, for they do not like to perceive themselves as pursuing US national ~~intervention~~ interests in an alliance relationship ~~at~~ while overriding the desires of the partner. ~~ex~~ Moreover, both policies in a situation of this kind are likely to turn out badly. E.g., dilemmas as to what person or individual to back in the nation; an established government or leader, or an emerging or recently triumphant group. US cannot avoid all choices, or ensuing responsibility; it has been criticized for backing an established but vulnerable or unpopular regime "unrealistically" or inappropriately; or for failing to throw its full influence against a protesting coup group to preserve a given regime.

Or, dilemmas arise in deciding whether to use AID or military assistance funds in one way or another (with allocations having political significance for factions), or how strongly to press advice on operations or organization.

put all of this under the umbrella of charge of "intervention" and assistance.
The more US advice and assistance is invested, the more concerned we must be to "protect the investment," to press our advice and to take on onus of intervening, because the stakes are actually higher for us: not because of the effort and materiel that might be wasted but because the international consequences ((and domestic consequences)) of failure ~~in~~ in this particular case become much greater. (Though our choices and our advice will not always be right or wise, even compared to the local opinions). Our own national security--via our prestige--becomes more immediately involved; and we cannot wholly delegate responsibility for the safeguarding of our security to another government.

Thus, US aid in money, materiel and people does increase the US commitment (i.e., increases likelihood of getting more US aid, if necessary) to success; but at price of increasing US pressure to adopt means and tactics that US believes best)